'Two-dimensional semantics' denotes a family of semantic theories rooted in intensional semantics, held together by shared general ideas, yet divided by deep divergences in semantic aims and philosophical aspiration. 
Description of the Theory

Fundamental Ideas of Two-Dimensional Semantics
Traditional intensional semantics assigns a sentence a single intension. This intension captures how the truth of the sentence depends on, and varies with, the respective facts. 2d-semanticists draw our attention to another dependence. A sentence's truth-value also depends on, and varies with, what the sentence means. 2d-semanticists agree that our semantics has to account for this twofold dependence of truth-value on meaning and fact, and they agree that we can capture both dependencies relying on the apparatus of possible worlds and intensions familiar from intensional semantics. We just need to add the distinction between counterfactual and actual worlds, and we have to make use of the threefold distinction of kinds of intension this effects.
The twofold dependence noted is most pronounced in sentences contain- 
Kaplan: Actual Worlds as Contexts of Use
Kaplan ([8] and [9] ) propounds a semantic interpretation of the 2d-framework. He holds that (1) 
Chalmers: Actual Worlds as Epistemic Possibilities
Chalmers ([1] to [4] ) offers an epistemic interpretation of the 2d-framework.
Chalmers (1) maintains that actual worlds are epistemic possibilities, and he (2) holds that we need actual worlds and primary intensions to capture the epistemic dependence of meaning.
Chalmers draws on two ideas. His one idea is that reference and truth are with the respective epistemic possibility that is realized in our world.
